Writer, performer, and wine student in Chicago.
A published appellate court opinion bearing my name appears near the top of search results. This site presents my account of the case alongside specific citations to the public court record — so you can verify every factual claim I make against the documents themselves.
The Illinois Domestic Violence Act requires a qualifying relationship between the parties and conduct constituting abuse. Illinois also offers civil remedies that require neither — and carry none of the federal consequences the IDVA triggers automatically. The remedy used in this case was the one with the most serious consequences and the highest threshold of prerequisites. The record shows those prerequisites were not met.
| Order of Protection 750 ILCS 60 — IDVA · Used in this case |
Civil No Contact Order 740 ILCS 22 — CNCO |
Stalking No Contact Order 740 ILCS 21 — SNCO |
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Relationship required | Yes. Petitioner must establish "family or household member" status — including through a qualifying dating relationship. This threshold is contested in this case. | No. Available to victims of sexual assault or sexual abuse regardless of relationship. | No. Available to victims of stalking regardless of relationship. |
| Federal firearms disability | Yes — automatic. 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) attaches immediately upon entry of a qualifying civil protective order. Active for the full duration of the order. | No. Civil No Contact Orders do not trigger the federal firearms disability. | No. Stalking No Contact Orders do not trigger the federal firearms disability. |
| LEADS database entry | Yes — entered into Illinois Law Enforcement Agencies Data System. Appears in law enforcement background checks. | Yes — entered in LEADS. | Yes — entered in LEADS. |
| Basis for petition | Abuse (physical, harassment, intimidation, interference with personal liberty) by a family or household member. | Sexual assault or sexual abuse by any person. No relationship requirement. | Stalking as defined under 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3 by any person. No relationship requirement. |
| Duration (plenary) | Up to 2 years. Renewable. | Up to 2 years. Renewable. | Up to 2 years. Renewable. |
| Standard of proof | Preponderance of the evidence. | Preponderance of the evidence. | Preponderance of the evidence. |
| Ex parte emergency order | Available. Granted same day on petitioner's sworn testimony alone. | Available. Same process. | Available. Same process. |
| Why it matters here | This remedy requires establishing a dating relationship. If no qualifying relationship existed, this order should not have been available. The federal firearms disability — imposed for two years — flows directly from this choice of remedy. | If the concern was harassment or threatening online content, this remedy does not require a dating relationship. No federal firearms disability would have attached. | If the concern was stalking behavior through online videos and posts, this remedy addresses that directly — without a relationship requirement and without triggering a federal firearms disability. |

The legal system uses different standards of proof for different situations — and the gap between them is enormous. Where a proceeding falls on this spectrum determines how easy or difficult it is to win, and how much protection the accused has. Orders of protection sit at the lowest end of the civil spectrum. Understanding why matters.
Lowest burden
Highest burden
Federal firearms disability under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8). A person convicted of criminal domestic violence after a jury trial proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt loses the right to own a firearm. A person subject to a civil order of protection entered by one judge under the preponderance standard also loses the right to own a firearm — for the duration of the order. The federal law makes no distinction between the two. The consequence is identical. The standard of proof required to trigger it is not. In this case, a two-year federal firearms disability was imposed based on one person's uncorroborated testimony about events from four and a half years earlier, in a civil proceeding with no jury, no physical evidence, and no corroborating witnesses.
Before the plenary hearing — before any cross-examination, any evidence, any opportunity to respond — an Emergency Order of Protection can be granted the same day a petition is filed. The statutory standard under 750 ILCS 60/214(c)(4) requires only that the court examine the petitioner under oath and find that the petition's averments are "sufficient to indicate abuse." No respondent present. No evidence tested. No cross-examination. No opportunity to deny. In this case the emergency order was granted on November 6, 2020, based on a brief hearing in which Bujdoso testified alone. That order triggered a federal firearms disability the same day. It remained in effect, extended repeatedly, for nearly two years before the plenary hearing concluded. By the time Lenington had his first opportunity to present his full account before a court, the emergency order had already been in place for eighteen months.
Everything below is drawn from the public court record. Opinions are clearly labeled as such. Citations are provided so anyone can verify.
750 ILCS 60/103(6) explicitly excludes ordinary fraternization in business or social contexts from the definition of a dating relationship. Both parties agreed on what each encounter consisted of.
"Was he your boyfriend?" "I would not have called him my boyfriend."
Exchange between Judge Bertucci Smith and Bujdoso at the ex parte hearing, November 6, 2020 — Transcript R-4. Her own sworn words before the claim was upgraded. The second judge left the "Boyfriend/Girlfriend Dating Relationship" box on the order form blank.
March 2016: I was emcee at an open mic where she was one of approximately fifty performers. April 2016: I visited her bar as a patron to assess it as a performance venue. May 2016: I performed at her bar's open mic and stayed as a paying customer until she asked me to leave at closing. That was the entirety of our in-person contact. Every occasion involved me performing comedy, her bartending, or both. The Illinois Domestic Violence Act explicitly states that "ordinary fraternization between 2 individuals in business or social contexts shall not be deemed to constitute a dating relationship." Neither party disputed what those interactions consisted of.
The trial court characterized both bar visits as "dates" constituting a serious courtship. Bujdoso's own contemporaneous text to Abby Stassen — written the night of or shortly after May 23, 2016 — describes what she told Lenington that night: his opinion was "uninformed and unnecessary at best, considering tonight was the second ever time you've been here, and first time for the mic." In her own real-time words: the May 23 visit was his second visit to the bar and his first ever visit to an open mic there. The court called it a date. She called it his second time at the establishment. Both statements are in the record.
The description of the relationship between Lenington and Bujdoso changed three times across filed documents. Each change is precisely dated. None was accompanied by an explanation of why recollection suddenly improved.
Stage 1 — November 6, 2020 (original affidavit, C-34): "went on one (1) date." Written by word and by number. At the ex parte hearing the same day, Bujdoso testified she "would not have called him my boyfriend." The first judge hearing the case said: "I'm not sure you even have a dating relationship with him."
Stage 2 — February 25, 2021 (Lincoln's Written Objections, paragraph 2): "The parties enjoyed a brief dating relationship in 2016, during which MARK courted ALLYSSA." This is the first documented appearance of the word "courted" anywhere in the record. It appears in a filing dated February 25, 2021 — within weeks of Lenington's January 2021 Motion to Vacate, which cited Alison v. Westcott. The legal standard was disclosed. Within weeks, the language shifted to match it.
Stage 3 — May 28, 2021 (Lincoln's Motion in Limine, paragraph 1): "the parties communicated on a consistent basis for almost three (3) months and the parties went out on dates." Plural dates. Consistent communication for three months. This filing was made after Lincoln's own Exhibit B — the full Facebook Messenger conversation — was already in the record. That exhibit shows scattered messages over 63 days on comedy industry topics. It describes no dates, no intimate content, no consistent communication. The characterization in the Motion in Limine contradicts Lincoln's own submitted evidence.
There is also a documented timeline discrepancy. At the ex parte hearing on November 6, 2020, Bujdoso testified the bar incident occurred "that summer, it was around July." The trial testimony, the judge's ruling, and every other document establish the bar incident as May 23, 2016 — two months earlier. That is a two-month discrepancy in the central incident of the case, between the first sworn account and the later one.
Her testimony supported the claim that I knew where she lived by stating I had driven her home on one occasion. I stated throughout these proceedings — beginning with my written response at C-191 — that I have never owned or operated a vehicle in Illinois and have never held an Illinois driver's license. This is verifiable through state DMV records. I cross-examined her on this claim directly.
There is one screenshot of a Facebook Messenger exchange in which I asked whether she wanted to get dinner sometime and whether she was single. She said yes to both. The dinner was never arranged. It never happened. In the same conversation both parties expressed they were not looking for anything serious. That one screenshot is what the petitioner built an entire case on. Everything else — the claimed date at Flat Iron, the claimed daily communication, the claimed courtship, the claimed car ride home, the claimed arm-grab at the coffee shop — rests on testimony alone. No corroborating document. No witness. No police report. No contemporaneous mention to anyone. One unremarkable social invitation surrounded by sworn statements that the record itself contradicts. That is the evidentiary foundation of a two-year order of protection and a permanent published appellate opinion.
In her May 23, 2016 Facebook Messenger exchange with Lenington — submitted by Lincoln as Exhibit B to his own filings — Bujdoso writes: "We went out after to flat iron to talk business." The "we" refers to her and David, the other person present at North Bar that night. This is the only contemporaneous mention of Flat Iron in any document connected to this case. It describes a visit to Flat Iron that does not involve Lenington and characterizes it as a business conversation. At trial, Bujdoso testified that her date with Lenington took place at Flat Iron in May 2016 (SUP R-39). This was the first time "Flat Iron" appeared in any court filing as the claimed date location — not in the original affidavit, not in any pre-trial sworn filing. In every round of discovery — February 2021, the reformatted version, the final request in April 2021 — Lenington's first question was: "Which location were you referring to in your claim that we went on one (1) date?" The question was asked three times. It was never answered.
In his Opposition to the Motion in Limine (C-225), Lenington documented: "Mark was also unaware that the hearing was set for 2pm and was under the assumption that it would be held at 9am. Mark requested the disposition sheet but the court failed to provide it to him although the Petitioner's attorney was provided with it." A represented party does not walk into their own hearing not knowing what time it starts. The disposition sheet — the document specifying the hearing time — was provided to Lincoln but not to Lenington. He called the courthouse in May and still was not told the correct time for the June 1st hearing. This is the asymmetry in practice: Lincoln knew when the hearing was. Lenington had to guess.
Two videos were made in October and November 2020 — both played in court. The appellate opinion describes the Halloween video in detail near its opening. Less discussed is the first video, which predated it, references it, and contains a pre-litigation on-camera account of the May 23 bar incident that matches Lenington's sworn testimony exactly throughout proceedings.
The honest accounting: The video was graphically violent, in poor taste, and created a context that was easy to weaponize against me legally. I should not have made it the way I did. That said — it was fiction, publicly posted, inspired by Chicago's own horror-comedy tradition, and made by someone who had been subjected to years of false accusations online with no recourse. The pandemic, the isolation, the pile-on of people calling me things I was not — that was the context. Context does not excuse the content. But context is part of the truth, and the truth is what this site is for."The video was not meant as a threat, and he did not post it with the goal of Bujdoso viewing it."
Lenington's testimony — Report of Proceedings, October 2021 hearing. Stated consistently from the first motion through the final petition.Orders of protection restrict contact with the protected person. What counts as "contact" has evolved as courts have addressed social media. The cases that found social media activity to constitute contact share a common element: each involved a deliberate act directed specifically at the protected person. Publicly posting content to your own account — with the protected person blocked — is a different category entirely. The distinction matters.
Five weeks after Justice Hyman authored the order affirming the protective order against me, he and Justice C.A. Walker — two of my three judges — sat on a published decision that reversed an order of protection on facts far stronger for finding a dating relationship than mine. Same division of the First District. Same statute. Opposite outcome.
Read those columns again. The party with two real dates and sexual intimacy was held not to be in a dating relationship. I — with no dates outside a bar where one of us was working, contact a neutral observer would call ordinary social fraternization — was. If the stronger facts failed, the weaker ones cannot logically succeed.
The statute decides this. The Domestic Violence Act says that "neither a casual acquaintanceship nor ordinary fraternization between 2 individuals in business or social contexts shall be deemed to constitute a dating relationship." 750 ILCS 60/103(6). Two of the three encounters were visits to the bar where the petitioner worked as a bartender — the textbook business/social context the statute carves out. Remove them, as the statute requires, and one meeting remains. And the appellate court itself accepted the rule from Alison C. v. Westcott that a single date cannot establish a dating relationship. The affirmance survives only by counting, as "dates," the very encounters the legislature excluded.
This is not a quarrel with the facts. Whether I was at the bar was never disputed. Whether being at a bar where the other person is working counts as a "date" is not a fact at all — it is the application of a statutory term to undisputed conduct, a question of law. Calling it a "date" does not make it one when the statute says contact in that setting is not a dating relationship.
"When you talk about a dating relationship, that is a subjective concept. The intent of the parties matters... There had to be an intent on both sides to enter into such a relationship in the first place."
Opposing counsel's closing argument — July 19, 2022 · R-262. The reasoning the court accepted here."The 'intent' to have one is not the same as having one."
McClellan v. Hull, 2023 IL App (1st) 220465, ¶ 74 — Justices Hyman and C.A. Walker concurring, five weeks after affirming the order against me, rejecting the reasoning used in my case.My case is an unpublished Rule 23 order — not precedent. The decision that contradicts it is published, citable law. And mine is not the mainstream Illinois rule: a family-law commentary describes Bujdoso as a Rule 23 case "leading us in New Jersey's direction," while noting that Alison C. "is still the law of the land in Illinois." My panel reached its result by importing another state's broader standard — from a statute that contains no business-or-social-fraternization exclusion — to override Illinois's narrower text. If the conduct warranted any civil remedy, the legislature provided one that requires no dating relationship at all: a Stalking No Contact Order, 740 ILCS 21/15, available precisely "when relief is not available under the Domestic Violence Act."
The appellate court issued an unpublished order in November 2023 affirming the trial court's ruling. Unpublished orders are not citable as precedent under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23, but they are public documents. For a condensed, transcript-anchored breakdown, see the full Bujdoso v. Lenington case summary and record-based rebuttal.
Below is a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis. Items are categorized as factual contradictions, omissions, reasoning problems, and correct rulings. Every record citation is verifiable. Every quotation from the opinion is exact.
This is my personal account and assessment. My opinions are labeled as opinions. Every factual claim is cited to a specific document in the public record. Readers are encouraged to read the opinion and the cited documents and reach their own conclusions.
Citation: 2023 IL App (1st) 221236-U, filed November 17, 2023, Sixth Division. Rule 23 order — non-precedential.

The National Conference of State Legislatures maintains an authoritative survey of how every state defines domestic violence and the relationships that trigger protection order jurisdiction. Reading Illinois's definition against the other forty-nine states reveals something important: Illinois has one of the least specific positive definitions of "dating relationship" among states that include a casual acquaintance exclusion.
Most states that exclude casual acquaintances also define what a dating relationship actually requires — frequent interaction, expectation of affection or sexual involvement, romantic or intimate nature, continuity over time, or declarations of romantic interest. Illinois excludes certain things but provides almost no positive definition of what is required. That gap is what allowed a trial court to characterize three bar visits — two of which occurred while one party was working as a bartender — as constituting a serious courtship.
Several states have provisions that would have barred this petition entirely — or required a substantially higher factual showing — under their definitions of dating relationship. Illinois is an outlier not in having a casual acquaintance exclusion, but in failing to pair that exclusion with a meaningful positive standard.
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, "Domestic Violence/Domestic Abuse Definitions and Relationships." All statutory text reproduced for educational and comparative purposes from public government records.
Court opinions become AI training data. AI training data becomes search results. Here is what the major AI systems say when asked about this case — and where each goes wrong. Tested May 2026.
When asked "Did Mark Lenington put his hands on Allyssa Bujdoso?", Google Gemini responded that Lenington "confronted her at a Chicago comedy theater, blocked her path, and grabbed her arm when she tried to walk away."
None of that is in any court document. The alleged incident occurred at a coffee shop, not a comedy theater. "Blocked her path" appears in no transcript, no affidavit, no petition, and no court opinion. Gemini fabricated specific physical details — a location and a physical action — and presented them as court record. This is a documented AI hallucination about a real person in a real legal case.
Allyssa Bujdoso testified at trial that on the day after a late-night incident at her bar, she ran into Mark Lenington at a coffee shop and he grabbed her arm. This is her testimony. It is in the record. It was found credible by the trial court.
It is also the only evidence of this event that exists. No police report was filed in 2016. No witness was named or called. No text message from the time mentions it — Bujdoso's own texts to Abby Stassen describe the bar incident but do not mention any coffee shop encounter or physical contact. It was not mentioned in any contemporaneous document. The first time it appears in any record is in the petition filed four and a half years later.
Mark Lenington denied this incident occurred in every filing at every level. In his formal response to Bujdoso's Request for Admission of Facts (Response #7), he stated under oath: "This is 100% false. There was no encounter at an open mic coffeeshop between us as claimed in the petition. This is an outright fabrication and I'll be showing that. Allyssa Bujdoso knows that this is simply not true." That denial is part of the official court record under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216 — not a characterization, a sworn formal response to a specific legal demand to admit or deny.
In his Respondent's Denials and Admissions (C-222, filed June 1, 2021), Lenington stated the most comprehensive single denial in the record: "Mark and Allyssa did not go on a date. The two parties never met at any point for any one on one interaction. They never at any point exchanged any intimate contact or affection and there was no expectation thereof. Mark and Allyssa were casual acquaintances. Mark did not pursue Allyssa or ask her to join him for any further activity on the night he last saw her. Mark sent a message on Facebook Messenger, but not text message via phone. Allyssa participated in the conversation and was responsive throughout the entire exchange. Mark and Allyssa did not meet the next day, intentionally or unintentionally. Mark and Allyssa shook hands during their first meeting in March but never had physical contact again. Mark has never put his hands on Allyssa in any aggressive or unwanted way and did not pursue her for affection or intimacy at any point. Allyssa did not discuss the alleged 'coffee shop' encounter with Abby Stassen because it never happened. DENIED."
AI systems that present the allegation as established fact without noting the absence of corroboration or the consistent formal denial are not giving you the complete picture. The civil standard is preponderance of the evidence — more likely than not. The court found Bujdoso credible. That credibility finding does not transform uncorroborated testimony into independently verified fact.
Asked simply to describe the case, both Google Gemini and Grok reported that Lenington conceded a dinner took place. Gemini: he "had shared a single dinner that he characterized as non-romantic." Grok: "their only contact was a brief, non-romantic dinner in the Chicago comedy scene in 2016."
The appellate opinion itself says the opposite — twice. At ¶16 it records Lenington's position that the parties "discussed the possibility of going out to dinner, [but] this was a casual discussion that did not result in a meeting." At ¶40 it states plainly: "While they discussed going to dinner, they did not go to dinner." Lenington's position across every filing was zero dates and a dinner that was proposed and never happened. Both systems invented an event that the very opinion they were summarizing expressly says did not occur — and placed the invented concession in Lenington's own mouth.
If you encountered information about this case through an AI system, verify it against the primary source: the actual appellate opinion at 2023 IL App (1st) 221236-U, publicly available through the Illinois courts system ↗ and on Westlaw and Casetext.
This section is for anyone navigating the Illinois court system alone. What I wish I had known before I filed anything.
Every legal avenue in this matter has been exhausted or is foreclosed as a practical matter. This section explains each one plainly — not to invite sympathy, but because anyone in a similar situation deserves to understand exactly how these doors close.
The two-year Plenary Order of Protection expired on July 19, 2024. The federal firearms disability that attached to it expired with it. Mark Lenington is legally free — no active order, no active restriction, no ongoing federal consequence. He has never been convicted of any crime in connection with this matter. The proceeding was civil.
What does not expire is the published appellate opinion in Bujdoso v. Lenington, 2023 IL App (1st) 221236-U. It exists in legal databases permanently. It appears in search results. It will appear in background checks that include court records. No court will remove it, de-index it, or issue an order limiting its circulation. It is part of the permanent public record of the Illinois court system.
This site exists because the opinion is permanent. So is the right to respond to it. Every claim on this site is documented. Every citation is to a public record. Every opinion is labeled as such. The legal fight is over. The factual record — complete, with both sides represented — is what this site is for.
When civil protective orders are granted on contested facts, the consequences extend far beyond a piece of paper. This section exists because I lived part of what is described here — and because I wish someone had written it in 2016.
The academic literature on false accusations is genuinely contested. Below is a fair summary of both positions, with citations. Neither side should be dismissed.
The most frequently cited peer-reviewed studies find false report rates between 2% and 10% of investigated cases. A 2010 study by Lisak et al. examining a decade of reports at a single university found a rate of 5.9%. A 2016 meta-analysis by Ferguson & Malouff across multiple studies produced a weighted average of 5.2%.
Researchers in this camp argue that the social cost of false accusation — disbelief, stigma, retraumatization — means most people who report are telling the truth. Under-reporting of genuine violence remains the larger documented problem.
The dominant framework: false accusations exist and cause harm, but treating accusation as presumptively false causes far greater aggregate harm to genuine victims.
Critics note that even a 5% rate represents tens of thousands of individuals annually across the United States. Studies using more expansive definitions or single-jurisdiction data have found rates as high as 41% (Kanin, 1994 — a widely contested single-site study). The 8–11% historically listed as "unfounded" by the FBI does not equal false, and vice versa.
For civil protective orders specifically — which carry immediate federal firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), potential job loss, housing consequences, and social stigma — there is almost no peer-reviewed research on false issuance rates. The ex parte structure means contested facts are resolved before the respondent has any opportunity to respond.
The gap: the criminal false accusation literature cannot be cleanly applied to civil orders with lower evidentiary standards and reduced due process.
There is a critical qualifier buried in the most-cited figure: the 2–10% rate describes claims that were investigated and then formally classified as false. It is not 2–10% of all accusations. A large share of reports — in many datasets 40–50% or more — are never fully investigated, are withdrawn, stall for lack of evidence, or are closed without any determination of truth or falsity. Those cases have no outcome at all. They are neither "founded" nor "false." They simply sit outside the denominator.
This cuts in more than one direction, which is why it belongs here rather than in either column above. Some uninvestigated claims are surely true reports that fell through the cracks — a point victim advocates correctly raise. But some are surely false or unsubstantiated claims that were simply never tested. The honest conclusion is that the true rate of false accusations is unknown, because a 2–10% figure calculated only on the minority of cases that reach a formal classification cannot be projected onto the cases that never do. A percentage is only as meaningful as what it is a percentage of.
For civil protective orders specifically, the problem is sharper still: most are resolved by agreed order, default, or expiration — never adjudicated on the merits at all. There is no investigative body classifying them as founded or false. The "2–10%" criminal-investigation figure has no civil-order equivalent, and applying it across that gap is exactly the kind of category error this section is meant to flag.
Adrian Grounds (2004) studied men released after wrongful criminal conviction and found PTSD, chronic depression, identity disruption, and in several cases suicidal ideation — even after exoneration. The damage was not undone by vindication.
Loeffler, Hyatt & Ridgeway (2019) documented significant mental health deterioration following false arrest, including anxiety, depression, and social withdrawal — effects that persisted years later.
The psychological injury mechanism is consistent across cases: social isolation, loss of professional standing, financial devastation, family rupture, and the particular cruelty of being disbelieved about your own life by institutions with authority over it.
Criminal exoneration cases represent the clearest documented harm — but criminal proceedings have higher evidentiary standards, constitutional protections, and appointed counsel. Civil protective orders have none of these, yet carry many of the same consequences.
A plenary civil order of protection in Illinois results in federal firearms disability (indistinguishable from felony conviction for that purpose), public record, removal from the home, restricted contact with children, and in many cases employment loss — all resolved at a preponderance standard, ex parte.
There is no formal innocence project for civil orders. There is no established exoneration pathway. There is, often, no attorney. This is the environment in which psychological damage accumulates.
What follows contains references to suicide. The goal of including it is awareness, not sensationalism. If you are struggling, please use the resources below before reading further.
There is no published epidemiological study specifically measuring suicide rates among people falsely accused of domestic violence or subject to false protective orders. The population is not well-defined, under-reported, and legally contested by definition.
What exists: documented cases. High-profile false accusation cases — the Duke Lacrosse players, Brian Banks, many lesser-known individuals — include accounts of severe depression, suicidal ideation, and in some cases completed suicides in the months or years following false accusations before or after resolution.
The risk factor profile is well-established even without accusation-specific data: social isolation, loss of employment, loss of housing, separation from children, public humiliation, financial ruin, and ongoing legal uncertainty are all individually documented suicide risk factors. False accusations frequently combine several simultaneously.
Women are falsely accused. It happens in custody disputes, in workplace settings, in community conflicts. The psychological damage is not gendered. The crisis resources above are for everyone.
But the population disproportionately affected by false domestic violence accusations is male. Men are named as respondents in protective order proceedings at a significant majority rate. They receive less institutional support, face greater cultural skepticism about victimhood, and have fewer dedicated advocacy organizations.
Men also complete suicide at roughly four times the rate of women in the United States (CDC, WISQARS). The combination of higher base rate and lower access to support creates elevated risk when false accusations intersect with the documented psychological harm profile above.
This is not a men's rights argument. It is a public health observation. People are dying, and the intersection of false accusations and suicide is under-researched and under-discussed.
In 2016, when this began, I was not in danger of hurting myself. But for the first time in my life I genuinely understood why some men do.
I had watched my reputation deteriorate in real time — in a community I had built relationships in for years. I had received a legal document telling me I was a danger to someone I had met a handful of times across years. I was navigating a system I had no preparation for, with no attorney, no precedent, and no road map. And I could not talk about it openly because the order itself was a social sentence before any finding.
I felt horrible for the men — and the women — who had faced this and decided there was no way out. I still do. That feeling was the beginning of this site. Not the anger. The grief.
If you are in that place right now — falsely accused, legally trapped, socially isolated, publicly damaged — please use the resources above. The research says it gets worse before it gets better. It also says that with support, people come through it. I did. The record is now public. You are reading this.
In November 2023 the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, published an opinion in Bujdoso v. Lenington that appears as one of the top results when you search my name. That opinion is the court's account of a dispute. This site is mine.
I am based in Chicago. I work in the wine and hospitality industry. I was the subject of a petition for order of protection filed in Cook County's Domestic Violence Division in November 2020. I represented myself throughout the proceedings — through the trial court, the appellate court, a petition for rehearing, and a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.
I lost. Partly because I believe the legal outcome was wrong on the merits. Partly because I was fighting without the tools most people assume are available. There is no right to counsel in civil domestic violence proceedings. I had no money for a private attorney. AI legal assistants were not widely available in 2020. Court clerks provide guidance to petitioners navigating the filing process — that assistance does not extend to respondents in the same way. I did not know what manifest weight of the evidence meant, what Rule 341 required, or that arguments not cited to the record are forfeited on appeal. I learned all of those things after they had already cost me the case.
Steve Lincoln called me on approximately five occasions before scheduled hearings to offer an Agreed Order. I declined every time. I was not willing to place any order in the court system with my name next to hers, give the other side any leverage, or waive any right I had. Most people would have signed. I understood exactly what I would be giving away and I refused. That decision made the proceedings longer and the outcome more permanent. I stand by it.
What is also true is that every interaction between us occurred in a business or social context that the statute explicitly excludes from the definition of a dating relationship. Her own text message from 2016 — written four and a half years before she filed anything — says no date occurred. Her own sworn affidavit says one date. The trial court found three. And five weeks after affirming my case, the same panel reversed a nearly identical case on stronger facts.
The order expired in July 2024. I am legally free. The opinion is permanent. This site exists so that anyone who searches my name has access to both sides of the story — and so that anyone navigating similar circumstances has the information I did not have.